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Agenda Item 9: Other issues

INITIATIVE OF DEVELOPMENT A SECURITY PROGRAMME MODEL FOR AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

(Presented by Civil Aviation Authority – CAA - Brazil)

SUMMARY

This study note presents an initiative of the Brazilian civil aviation authority related to the creation of an Aircraft Operator Security Programme model (AOSP) with the purpose of simplifying the process of development, analysis and approval of this programme when submitted by Aircraft Operators and make it become an effective tool that contributes to the improvement of the AVSEC level.

References:

- Annex 17

Strategic Objectives	*This study note is related to the strategic objective B of ICAO*

1. Introduction

1.1 Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention (1944) establishes the need to prepare a security program by the aircraft operators, to comply with the NCASP guidelines of the country where operations are performed. Among the rules described in Annex 17, standard 3.3.1 stands out:

> *3.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators providing service from that State have established, implemented and maintained a written operator security programme that meets the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that Estate.*

1.2 The purpose of this study note is to present to the AVSEC/FAL Regional Group an initiative that was developed in Brazil as a way of seeking compliance with this standard.

2. Development, analysis and approval process of the aircraft operators' security programme

2.1 Since 2004, the Brazilian guideline for the preparation of the aircraft operators´ security programme has basically contained the structure and the minimum content of the programme, maintaining compatibility with the security programme model provided by ICAO Security Manual (*Doc 8973, appendix 24, 8th edition*).

2.2 The aircraft operators used these guidelines to develop and submit their security programmes for analysis and approval of the Civil Aviation Authority. In recent years, the Brazilian CAA has identified some difficulties in the process of development, analysis and approval, among which the following stood out:

a. too long period between the submission of the first version of the programme to the CAA and the effective publication of the administrative act approving the document, due mainly to two factors:

   i. the extensive reading phase that is demanded from the CAA's employee to complete all document evaluation; and

   ii. the time spent by the aircraft operator to review the programme in order to comply with the various necessary corrections to make it become compatible with the AVSEC standards, and therefore acceptable to the CAA, both in terms of document structure and procedures described.

b. a perception that the document, when finally approved, was not providing the desired improvement in the AVSEC level, due in part to the absence of brevity and clarity in the security procedures contained in the programme.

c. a barrier to effective aircraft operators oversight, considering the prolix style of the document that made the adequate identification of particularities concerning the operation and the security procedures applied by each aircraft operator quite difficult.

2.1 Considering this context, the Brazilian CAA identified the need of development of a normative instrument capable of reaching the following goals:

a. Making the process of development, analysis and approval of the security programme easier and faster.

b. Providing a practical guidance material to work as:

   i. a security programme model that could be adopted partially or entirely by aircraft operators, containing the State guidelines of the security procedures for the industry;

   ii. a reference material for the oversight work of civil aviation inspectors of Brazilian CAA.

2.2 As mentioned, Brazilian CAA aims to simplify the process of analysis and approval of existing security programmes. This simplification consists in making the submission of documents to the CAA more standardized, enabling more efficient document analysis.

2.3 The resources saved in the analysis and approval of the programme can be applied in continued monitoring of the activities executed by the aircraft operators, aiming to assure an effective improvement in aviation security level.

3. The method adopted to eliminate the deficiencies of the process

3.1 Brazilian CAA aimed to achieve the objectives mentioned above through three basic documents: the NCASP; a National Regulation aimed a aircraft operators (RBAC 108) and a Supplementary Instruction containing the security programme model.

3.2 Currently, Brazil has a NCASP approved by presidential decree, establishing AVSEC responsabilities of each organization of the civil aviation system and guidelines for the sector in relation to the protection of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.

3.2 Considering the NCASP, Brazilian CAA published the Brazilian Civil Aviation Regulation nº 108 (RBAC 108), containing the aviation security requirements (preventive security and contingency measures), applicable to the aircraft operators.

3.3 Then, a Supplementary Instruction nº 108 (IS 108) that describes the procedures that will be accepted by Brazilian CAA for compliance with each requirement in RBAC 108 was prepared.

3.4 The procedures described in IS 108 correspond to the preventive security and contingency measures and compose the AOSP model (Aircraft Operator Security Programme model) that may in some cases be used without any change by the aircraft operator.

3.5 More than one acceptable method of compliance was described by Brazilian CAA for some of the requirements in RBAC 108, providing alternatives to the aircraft operator, that can evaluate possibilities considering their operational characteristics and the infrastructure available at the aerodrome.

3.6 The appendix in this study note presents some extracts from the AOSP model in order to facilitate understanding of the Regional Group concerning these characteristics.

3.7 Any changes made in the AOSP model by an aircraft operator must be clearly identified in the index of the document submitted to Brazilian CAA allowing the CAA analyst to read only the procedures that contain different wording.

3.8 It is emphasized that when writing the preventive security and contingency procedures, Brazilian CAA sought to follow the recommended practices by the ICAO Security Manual (*Doc 8973, 7th and 8th edition*) as well as solutions already adopted by aircraft operators, both national and foreign ones operating in Brazil. Therefore, it is expected that most of the aircraft operators start to adopt AOSP model with little or no change at all.

3.9 Finally, it is important to mention that the procedures proposed as options for compliance with the RBAC 108 requirements, although based on practices and common procedures as well as widely recognized by the civil aviation industry, are not the only ways to check conformity with regulation. So other ways may also be appropriate to achieve the objectives of RBAC 108 and can be proposed in the AOSP to the Brazilian CAA. If approved, they can be adopted by aircraft operators.

4. Proposed actions

4.1 Invite representatives at the 3rd Regional Group Meeting of the AVSEC/FAL to get familiar with the methodology adopted by Brazil, verify the advantages and disadvantages in its application and assess the viability of this being adopted by other countries, so as to get a standard security programme adopted at the regional level.

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APPENDIX

EXTRACTS OF THE AOSP MODEL

In the extracts presented below, the requirements of RBAC 108 are contained within frames and followed by the acceptable procedures to achieve compliance.

1st Example

RBAC 108.25 (b). At the time of passenger's check-in, the aircraft operator must:

(1) inform the passenger about the materials considered forbidden in hand luggage and checked baggage for boarding aircraft; and

(2) advise the passenger to refuse to transport packages or objects received from strangers in hand luggage and checked baggage.

1. During passenger check-in, being it at the airline desk or through self-service, the aircraft operator provides message indicating:

a) objects considered forbidden to board on the aircraft, including liquid materials, in case of international flights, and guidance regarding the need to refuse to transport packages or objects received from strangers in hand luggage and checked baggage; or
b) when operationally unfeasible, < *describe a simplified way for the passenger to obtain information and advice, for example, through the website of the aircraft operator in the world wide web* >.

2. In case of desk check-in, the aircraft operator always provides an explanatory panel near (or on) the service counters, containing information about prohibited materials, including photos of some objects to draw the attention of passengers.

3. In case of desk check-in, the attendant performs the following procedures:

a) asks if the passenger is carrying or storing any of the explanatory panel´s materials, informing that such materials will not be allowed from the screening checkpoint into the security restricted area (SRA), and

b) advises the passenger to refuse to transport packages or objects received from strangers (explaining that such procedure is for his and other passengers safety) and interrogates if the passenger has prepared his own luggage and has full knowledge of its contents.

2nd Example

RBAC 108.25 (e). During boarding procedures, the aircraft operator must identify the passenger identification, ensuring that when boarding the aircraft, the passenger is the holder of the boarding pass and possesses a valid identification document, as provided by specific regulation on the matter.

1st Situation: Manual identification

1. During boarding time, the attendant identifies all passengers individually by:

a) Comparing passenger with the photo on the identification document;

b) Crosschecking the name on the document with the one in the boarding pass;

c) Verifying the date and flight number on the boarding pass; and

d) Evaluating aspects related to the authenticity of the identification document.

2. Each employee made available by the aircraft operator identifies one passenger at a time. The aircraft operator provides the necessary amount of employees to ensure that there is enough time to identify each passenger properly. Once identification is successful, the employee asks the passenger to go to the aircraft, ensuring that he does not remain or return to the boarding area, with passengers still not identified.

3. If the identification is not confirmed, first, the attendant seeks to clarify doubts with the passenger himself. If the explanation is not enough for the attendant to be sure about the authenticity or compatibility between the passenger, the identification and boarding pass, the attendant does not allow the passenger to board. Immediately, the attendant communicates the local police, or the security department of the aerodrome´s operator to adopt measures concerning the passenger's leaving the boarding room.

4. In case the passenger is carrying a Police Report, the identification is performed in accordance with paragraph F.1.200.1, however, without applying item (a), and still verifying the expiry date of such report, which for passenger boarding purposes must have been issued within sixty (60) days, as foreseen in the Brazilian CAA´s Resolution nº 130, from 2009.

2nd Situation: Biometric Identification

1. When checking-in, the passenger is advised by the attendant to perform the registration of his biometric data in the biometric identification system provided by the aircraft operator before accessing the boarding area. The passenger has the right to refuse to carry out the registration, and if so, board after manual identification.

Note: According to operational agreements between the aerodrome operator and the aircraft operators, the biometric identification system and other related resources can be provided and / or performed by the aerodrome operator.

2. The process of registration of biometric data includes careful verification of the passenger's identification document.

3. Once registered, the passenger does not need to perform the procedure at the same aerodrome or other aerodromes that share the same database.

4. In the boarding area, when the attendant authorizes boarding, passengers are advised to proceed to boarding gate to perform biometric identification.

5. If the equipment identifies compatibility, passengers will be allowed to access the aircraft.

6. If the equipment identifies incompatibility and the manual identification is not successful, passenger’s boarding will be denied.

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